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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
No. 216937 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Director Assistance Payment 
Administration, Utah State 
Department of Social Services, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO, aka 
RALPH G. ROMERO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Action by Plaintiff to recover assistance payments, 
which were allegedly extended to Defendant because of misre-
presentation to the Department of Social Services. 
DISPOSITION IN LOw~R COURT 
The trial court heard the matter on the merits and 
granted judgment to the Plaintiff 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order vacating the judgment 
in the lower court, and reversing and remanding the matter 
to the lower court with instructions to dismiss the case. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant received public assistance from the 
State of Utah in an amount of Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred 
Eight-one and 21/100 dollars ($11,981.21) from the Respondent 
during the period of February, 1969 through November, 1973 
intermittently. 
The Respondent filed a complaint to recover the 
assistance payments from the Appellant for misrepresentation 
in the applications for the assistance on January 11, 1974. 
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the 
Appellant retained an attorney to represent him, and the same 
filed a set of interrogatories, a set of requests for admis-
sion and a request for the production of documents, on April 5 
1974. 
The Respondent file its answers to interrogatories 
and answers to requests for admission on July 18, 1978, some 
four years and three and a half months latter. 
The Respondent filed his request for trial setting 
on the 15th of September, 1978, and the attorney for the 
Appel1ant withdrew from the case on the 25th day of September 
1978. Thereafter the Appellant went unrepresented to and 
through the trial on the merits which ended on June 15, 1979. 
From judgment in favor of the Respondent the Appel-
lant appeals. 
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ARGUMENT ONE 
THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE OF 
THE RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO RESPOND TO APPELLANTS REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION. 
In the facts of the case, the Appellant served a 
set of Requests for Admission on the Respondent, and the lat-
ter failed to either admit or deny or otherwise respond to the 
same until some four years, three and a half months latter. 
Rule 36(a), in relevant part, provides: 
Each matter of which an admission is requested 
shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted 
unless, within thirty days after service of the request, 
or within such shorter or longer time as the court may 
allow, the party to whom the request is directed 
serves upon the party requesting the admission a 
written answer or objection addressed to the matter 
signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless 
the court shortens the time a defendant shall not 
be required to serve answers or objections before 
the expiration of 45 days after service of the 
summons and complaint upon him . . . 
And Rule 36(b) provides: 
Any matter admitted under this Rule is conclusively 
established unless the court on motion permits with-
drawal or amendment of the admission . 
Well over a 1,000 days had expired prior to the time 
that the Respondent responded to the Requests for Admission, 
nor have they moved to withdraw or amend their admissions. 
Respondent have therefore admitted the matters contained in 
the Appellants Requests for Admission, which include: 
That Defendant (Appellant) had no (a) income 
which was not reported to you, or (b) assets which 
were not reported to you or (c) of which you wece 
not aware during periods while he was receiving 
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I 
( 
assistance payments. 
f 
Also, I 
That Defendant (Appellant) was entitled under ap- I 
plicable law and the determination made by your office' 
to receive each assistance payment received by him 
during the discovery period. 
Also, I 
That Defendant is not indebted to you in any amount~ 
I 
I 
The App_e~lant is not limited to the sanctions of Rule· 
37(c) because Rule 
ably fail to admit 
37(c) deals only to parties who unjustifi- ) 
facts, but who nevertheless have responded ~ 
to the request. By failing to respond to the requests, the fac: 
are admitted under Rule 36 (a), and the provisions of Rule 37(c) ( 
do not apply. Note Schmitt vs. Billings, et al., No. 16084, r 
filed August 24, 1979, not yet printed in the Pacific Reporter' 
I 
or Utah Reporter. 
Hence, "As (Respondents) have admitted all of the fac:~ 
noted supra, there remains no litigable issue, and (Appellant) ·I 
entitled to judgment against the . . . (Respondents). . . " not'( 
page 4, of Schmitt vs. Billings, et al. also W. B. Gardner, Inc~ 
vs. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P2d 734, Utah Supreme Court 
1977). 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE OF 
THE RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S INTERROGA-
TORIES. 
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In the facts of the case, the Appellant served a 
set of Interrogatories on the Respondent, and the latter 
failed to respond to the same for over four years. 
Rule 33(a) states: 
Any party may serve upon any other party written 
interrogatories to be answered by the party served 
The Party upon whom the interrogatories have 
been served shall serve a copy of the 9f answers 
and objections if any, within 30 days after service 
of the interrogatories 
Rule 37(d) states: 
If a party or an officer, director, or managing 
agent of a party or a person designedated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 3l(a) to testify on behalf of a 
party fails ... (2) to serve answers or objections 
to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after 
proper service of the interrogatories . . . the 
Court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others it may take any action author-
ized under paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of subdivision 
(b)(2) of this Rule. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides: 
An order striking out pleadings, or parts thereof, 
or staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or 
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party. 
As a result thereof, the party on whom the interroga-
tories are served has 30 day in which to respond, if they fail 
to do so, the Court may strike out the pleadings, dismiss the 
action or render a judgment by default against the respondents. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of W. B. Gardner, Inc., 
vs. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P2d 734, 1977, the Court 
l 
I 
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reasoned from the Naive v. Jones case, Ky., 353 S.W.2d 365 (19'1 
"·! 
that after 10 months the plaintiff had not undertaken to objecti 
to the interrogatories, to request additional time, or to explol 
or justify his failure to answer, and therefore and for other 
reasons sustained the dismissal of the action. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
THE MATTER SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE THE FAILURE TO 
RESPOND TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY IMPEDES TRIAL ON THE MERITS &~ 
MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN WHERTHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF 
THE COMPLAINT HAVE ANY FACTUAL MERIT. 
In the case at hand, the Respondent asserted at triaii 
that if the Appellant had any property five years before filin1 
for assistance he must so indicate on the application. ThereaU 
the Respondent took it upon themselves to prove that the AppelU 
was not entitled to the assistance in 1969, then filed the com· 
plaint in 1974, and then brings the man to trial in 19790 
The basis for the trial in 1979 is what occurred in;: 
after 1964. The record is replete with situations and circum· 
stances which the Respondent could not remember clearly because 
of a head injury since their occurrance and the length of time 
since their occurranceo (Please note pages 315 and 322 of the 
transcript as examples. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of VI 0 B 0 Gardner, IE£:. 
vs. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P2d 734, 1977, at page 738, 
the Court stated the following: 
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The extreme sanction of default or dismissal 
must be tempered by the careful exercise of judicial 
discretion to assure that its imposition is merited. 
Under Rule 37(d) sanctions are justified without re-
ference to whether the unexcused failure to make dis-
covery was wilful. The sanction of default judgment 
is justified where there has been a frustration of 
the judicial process, viz, where the failure to 
respond to discovery impedes trial on the merits and 
makes impossible to ascertain whether the allegations 
of the answer have any factual merit. 
In the matter at hand, if the discovery was responded 
to on time, the Appellant would have had the benefit of having 
less time to pass over to reconstruct what had happened, concern-
mitantly, the Appellant would have had the benefits of legal 
counsel, which he did not have at the time of trial. 
Therefore, the delay did infact impede the trial on 
the merits and made it impossible for the Appellant to ascer-
tain whether the allegations of the complaint had any factual 
merit. 
The Court further reasoned in the Gardner, as follows: 
A (party) may not ignore with impunity the require-
ments of Rule 33 ... A party to an action has a 
right to have the benefits of discovery procedure 
promptly, not only in order that he may have ample 
time to prepare his case, but also in order to bring 
to light facts which may entitled him to summary 
judgment or induce settlement prior to trial. The 
rules were designed to secure the "just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action," Rule 1. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
THE ~~TTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE. 
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According to the facts of the case, the complaint 
was filed on January 11, 1974, and the trial was concluded 
on June 15, 1979, for a total time of almost five and one 
half years. 
The time, however, between when the answer was filed 
and a request for trial was filed was almost four and one 
half years to the day. 
As a result, but for the failure of the Respondent 
to prevent unnecessary delay in the litigation, the total 
time of the matter which was five and one half years could 
have arguably been reduced to one year. 
In 24 AmJur 2d §59 is the following: 
As a general rule an action may be dismissed or a 
nonsuit granted because of the Plaintiff's failure 
to appear and prosecute his case, or for his failure 
to prosecute his case diligently. The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure specifically provide for dismis-
sal of an action, on motion of the defendant, for 
failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute his actions or 
claims, and similar provisions are found in the prac· 
tice statutes and rules of practice in other juris-
dictions. Such a provision for dismissal for want of 
prosecution is applicable at the pleading stage of 
the case. Its obvious purpose is to prevent unnec-
essary harassment and delay in litigation. 
In a 1975, Utah Supreme Court case, the Court stated 
that where after two years the Plaintiff was not ready for tria 
had not filed a bond, had made no discovery and had been dila~ 
in responding to Defendant's discovery, the matter was properl; 
dismissed. Maxfield v. Fishler, 538 P.2d 1323. 
Also note, Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v. Brmm, 23 
U. (2d) 389, 461 P.2d 464, and Thompson Ditch co. v. Jackson, 
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29 U. (2d) 259, 508 P. 2d 528, and Westinghouse Electric Supply 
Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P. 2d 876. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
AS A MATTER OF LACHES THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED. 
As a matter of mere equity and fairness, the matter 
should have been dismissed. Under the facts, a reasonable 
man could have assumed that the State had abandoned it suit, 
and as a result, concornrnitantly he relaxed his diligence to 
defend. 
In 24 AmJur 2d §59, at page 50 is the following: 
The question of laches depends on whether, under 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case 
the Plaintiff is chargeable with want of due dili-
gence in failing to proceed with reasonable promp-
titude. 
In the facts at hand, if the Plaintiff had with due 
diligence pursued the matter, the Defendant would have been 
represented by counsel. The Defendant would have had less 
time overwhich to pass, in order to reconstruct an account of 
what had taken place; he would have been able to better re-
collect any statements or representations, which were the basis 
of the judgment and could clearly have been better prepared 
to put on a defense. (According to the transcript the Respondent 
did not even have the benefit of his file when he represented 
himself, which vJas due to the extensive inactivity in the case) 
Therefore as a matter of laches, the matter should 
have·been dismissed. Please note Manson v. First National Bank, 
_q_ 
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366 Pa 211, 77 A2d 399, also Hollenback v. California Western 
R. R., C.A. 9th, 1972, 465 F.2d 122, also, Sellick v. Helson, 
C.A. 9th, 1972, 459 F. 2d 670, also, Maxey v. Citizens Natio~ 
Bank of Lubbock, Texas, C.A. 5th, 1972, 459 F.2d 56. 
CONCLUSION 
In the facts of this case, we have an individual 
who was at one time represented by Counsel. At the time of 
the representation by Counsel, the individual did nothing :_to de:f 
the matter, in fact filed timely each of the documents required I 
of him. 
The Plaintiff in the matter merely filed a com-
plaint, and did nothing further to forward the matter until sari 
four and one half years later, and then he filed documents whic' 
were over four years late. 
The Defendant in the meantime, was no longer re-
presented by Counsel, furthermore he could reasonably assume 
that the Plaintiff had abandoned the case. 
At the time of trial the Defendant went unassistE 
and infact could have surrrrnarily handled the matter if he hadar, 
attorney. Furthermore, over the vast time period the file was 
apparently lost, and so the Defendant while unassisted, proceei 
with the trial without so much as the file on the matter. 
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The Court could and should have dismissed the 
matter for any one of several reasons including: (1) Failure 
to respond to the Request for Admissions, timely; (2) Failure 
to respond to the Interrogatories, timely; (3) Delay in the 
responding to the discovery, which concornrnitantly delayed the 
trial; (4) Failure to Prosecute, and (5) Laches. 
The Court could have acted on its own motion 
to do any of the above-named remedies, but did not, and per-
haps it did not because it was not fully informed of the pro-
cedural errors in the matter. Yet the Court should have been 
so informed, and perhaps would have if the Defendant had an 
Attorney at the time of trial, and he did have at one time, 
but due to the great time in the delay he did not at the time 
when it carne on for trial. 
For failure to respond to the Requests for Admis-
sions, the matter submitted in the same are deemed admitted 
and so at the time of the trial there were no litigable issues 
because the Plaintiff had not moved for additional time or for 
permission to amend or alter the admissions. 
Without doing so, the matter was essentially res 
judicata, and should have never gone to trial, and for the same 
reason the judgment ought to be set aside, and the matter dis-
missed. 
1979. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of December, 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
// 
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